Substantial numbers of criminal offences are created in the UK in delegated legislation, often carrying heavy maximum penalties. The majority are created in statutory instruments passed under negative resolution procedure, which offers very limited opportunity for scrutiny and does not involve a parliamentary vote. This phenomenon has slipped under the radar of orthodox criminal law scholarship, where debate has focused primarily on the criteria that should be used to determine the content of the criminal law and on the principles to which such offences should conform, rather than on the process of creating criminal offences. Creating offences in delegated legislation raises questions of democratic legitimacy and has resulted in criminal offences being created which do not conform to basic principles of fair notice and proportionality of penalty. To address this, we propose that parliamentary approval should be required for all serious offences. It would be impractical to do this for all criminal offences, and direct participation in the legislative process via consultation can act as an alternative (or additional) legitimating principle. This does, however, require that the consultation process complies with certain basic minimum requirements, and we explain how these requirements might appropriately be framed.
INTRODUCTION
The Law Commission has described the decision about whether or not to create a criminal offence as 'a law-creating step of great (arguably, of something approaching constitutional) significance'. 1 A substantial body of work considers the appropriate content of the criminal law and attempts to find a set of workable criteria that can be used to make criminalisation decisions.
2 What has received less attention is the process by which criminal offences are created. Where this is mentioned at all, it tends to be assumed that proposals to create offences are voted on by Parliament before they become law. 3 Indeed, it has even been suggested that the decision to criminalise is so serious that it should require a Parliamentary 'supermajority'. 4 In this paper, we demonstrate that in reality the majority of criminal offences are created not in statutes, but in secondary legislation that is often not subject to a parliamentary vote at all. 5 What is more, the majority of offences created in this way carry heavy maximum penalties. 6 The mass creation of criminal offences in secondary legislation presents at the very least a challenge to the democratic legitimacy of the criminal law and, due to the limited scrutiny it receives in comparison to primary legislation, raises concerns about the extent to which it conforms to important principles, such as accessibility and fair notice, and proportionality of penalty. This also presents a challenge to the orthodox position in criminal law scholarship, which (as proposals for 'supermajorities' indicate)
frequently treats criminalisation as a solemn decision of the legislature when, in reality, it is a rather This is the accepted typescript of an paper accepted (in 2017) for publication in Legal Studies. Legal Studies is available online at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies This copy was deposited in Enlighten before the final version of the article was published; it will appear in due course. This copy may be used only for private research and study and not distributed further.
5 It might be assumed that the use of statutory instruments to create criminal offences would be limited to those attracting relatively minor penalties, but this is not the case. Table 2 displays the maximum penalty on conviction for the offences created. In every time period we examined, a sizeable number of offences created by statutory instrument were potentially punishable by imprisonment. The deprivation of liberty is obviously a severe sanction but almost as significant is that in each period, a sizeable number of offences created by statutory instrument were punishable by an unlimited fine. 14 For evidence of the use of secondary legislation to create criminal offences prior to the 1950s, see Horder, above n 13, at 108. 15 The figure here differs to that of 1235 mentioned above because it includes not only offences applicable to England and Wales but also those applicable to other parts of the UK. This is the accepted typescript of an paper accepted (in 2017) for publication in Legal Studies. Legal Studies is available online at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies This copy was deposited in Enlighten before the final version of the article was published; it will appear in due course. This copy may be used only for private research and study and not distributed further. Further evidence of the seriousness of these offences is shown in table 3, 17 which focuses solely on the offences created by statutory instrument where the maximum penalty available upon conviction was imprisonment. As table 3 shows, in every sample period a considerable number of offences with maximum penalties of two or more years' imprisonment were created in statutory instruments. One period that stands out in this respect is 1951-52 where 483 offences with a maximum penalty of two years' imprisonment were created by statutory instrument -91 per cent of all imprisonable offences created in this way -although this can in part be attributed to a particularly over-broad method of drafting used at the time. 18 Even in the more recent sample periods, though, the offences created by statutory instrument were highly punitive. In 2010-11, 133 offences were created by statutory instrument that had a maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment. 19 In the 2014 sample there were 390 criminal offences created by statutory instrument with a maximum penalty of two years' imprisonment and 57 with a maximum penalty greater than this (two at five years, 50 at seven years and five at ten years). 16 These figures include fines limited by reference to the standard scale, prescribed sum, and nominal limits. For the standard scale and prescribed sum, see the Interpretation Act 1978 Sch 1 and references therein. 17 Some of the percentage totals exceed 100 due to rounding. There were no maximum penalties of more than one year but less than two years' imprisonment in the relevant years. 18 Under the Defence (General) Regulations 1939, whereby contravention of or non-compliance with any provision was deemed an offence with a maximum penalty of two years' imprisonment: see Chalmers et al, above n 7, at 189-190. 19 Including 130 created by a single instrument, the Water Environment (Controlled Activities) (Scotland) Regulations 2011 (SSI 2011/209 ). This is the accepted typescript of an paper accepted (in 2017) for publication in Legal Studies. Legal Studies is available online at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies This copy was deposited in Enlighten before the final version of the article was published; it will appear in due course. This copy may be used only for private research and study and not distributed further.
7 The fact that so many criminal offences were created by statutory instrument in the UK and that so many were accompanied by high maximum penalties was an unexpected finding of our research. In
Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts, the Law Commission expressed concern that it is 'far too easy' 20 to create criminal offences via secondary legislation, but cited only one example of an imprisonable offence created in this way. 21 Our research demonstrates that delegated legislation is, in fact, the method by which the vast majority of criminal offences are created in the UK. Aside from the Law Commission's report, however, this issue sits in the shadows, barely noticed or subjected to critical scrutiny. This is the accepted typescript of an paper accepted (in 2017) for publication in Legal Studies. Legal Studies is available online at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies This copy was deposited in Enlighten before the final version of the article was published; it will appear in due course. This copy may be used only for private research and study and not distributed further.
8 2010-11 sample, only 11 per cent of the offences created in that 12 month period were targeted at the public at large. The remainder were either explicitly or implicitly targeted at persons engaging in a specialist activity, most commonly those operating in the course of a particular business. 24 The figures were similar for the other time periods.
25
This does not mean that these offences should escape scrutiny. The possible consequences for those convicted -even if they are operating in the course of a business or other specialist activity -are still very serious. Conviction carries with it considerable stigma and has collateral consequences beyond any sentence imposed. 26 It might be assumed that for many special capacity offences, it is a legal entity rather than an individual that would be the target of any prosecution. Our own data suggests,
however, that many of these offences clearly envisage individual liability, being targeted at, for example, the 'master of a ship' or other type of role. 27 Even where liability is imposed on a legal entity, the collateral consequences of conviction can still be severe in terms of reputation and resulting loss of business. 28 It should also be noted that the majority of businesses targeted by the offences are not large ones who can afford in-house legal teams or specialist legal advice. Many will be small family run businesses or sole traders (liable, in any event, to prosecution as individuals).
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Another reason why the offences created in secondary legislation have escaped scrutiny may be that they are rarely prosecuted, as regulators use the threat of prosecution as a means to secure 24 See Chalmers and Leverick, above n 7, at 557.This is the accepted typescript of an paper accepted (in 2017) for publication in Legal Studies. Legal Studies is available online at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies This copy was deposited in Enlighten before the final version of the article was published; it will appear in due course. This copy may be used only for private research and study and not distributed further.
9 compliance, prosecuting only as a last resort. 30 Even if prosecutions are rare, however, the creation of these offences still imposes compliance costs, whether financial or in the form of restrictions on freedom of action. Nor should the significance of an offence be dismissed simply because it is rarely prosecuted; even if prosecutions are rare there is a danger that they are arbitrary, causing substantial injustice to those who are prosecuted and convicted.
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The creation of criminal offences in statutory instruments raises two inter-related questions:
principled questions of democratic legitimacy and practical questions of quality, given the limited scrutiny secondary legislation receives. In order to address these questions, however, it is necessary first to consider the process by which statutory instruments are made.
HOW ARE STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS MADE?
The process by which primary legislation is made is relatively well understood. In the UK Parliament, This is the accepted typescript of an paper accepted (in 2017) for publication in Legal Studies. Legal Studies is available online at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies This copy was deposited in Enlighten before the final version of the article was published; it will appear in due course. This copy may be used only for private research and study and not distributed further.
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It is the opportunity for detailed scrutiny that is vastly reduced when law is made by secondary legislation. As Page observes, '[t]he whole point of delegated legislation is that Parliament does not have to look at it closely'. 33 There are a number of different types of secondary legislation but our focus here is on statutory instruments (SIs). An SI 34 can only be made if the power to make it is provided for in a statute (referred to here as an 'enabling' Act). The enabling Act sets out the scope of that power (typically a power given to a government minister to make regulations for a specific purpose) and specifies the procedure that must be used to make the regulations concerned.
There are two main procedures under which SIs can be made: negative resolution procedure (NRP) and affirmative resolution procedure (ARP Once an SI has been laid, it is considered by two Committees, both of which meet weekly in order to ensure that scrutiny takes place within the 40 days praying time. 43 The Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments (JCSI) 44 examines whether the SI has been made in accordance with the powers set out in the enabling Act. 45 It can also draw attention to an SI on any other grounds that do not impinge on the merits or the policy behind it. Such grounds include that it imposes a tax; that it is made in pursuance of any enactment containing specific provisions excluding it from challenge in the courts;
or that it appears to have retrospective effect. 46 As of the 2014-15 parliamentary session, the JCSI has also been empowered to report an SI specifically on the ground that it has supporting material that is inadequate to explain the policy intention or that it has been subject to an inadequate consultation process. 47 This is the accepted typescript of an paper accepted (in 2017) for publication in Legal Studies. Legal Studies is available online at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies This copy was deposited in Enlighten before the final version of the article was published; it will appear in due course. This copy may be used only for private research and study and not distributed further.
12 on grounds broadly similar to those of the JCSI, 49 although it differs from the JCSI in that its business is conducted in public. This is the accepted typescript of an paper accepted (in 2017) for publication in Legal Studies. Legal Studies is available online at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies This copy was deposited in Enlighten before the final version of the article was published; it will appear in due course. This copy may be used only for private research and study and not distributed further. This is the accepted typescript of an paper accepted (in 2017) for publication in Legal Studies. Legal Studies is available online at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies This copy was deposited in Enlighten before the final version of the article was published; it will appear in due course. This copy may be used only for private research and study and not distributed further.
14 ARP might be seen as an improvement on NRP in that it does at least require a positive parliamentary vote for the SI to become law. Under ARP, an instrument is either laid in draft and cannot be made unless the draft is approved by both Houses, or it is laid after making but cannot come into force unless it is approved. 67 Instruments made under ARP are subject to the scrutiny of the JCSI and the SLSC in the same way as those made under NRP but in addition all SIs made under ARP are referred to a Delegated Legislation Committee (DLC), a committee that is set up specifically to debate the instrument in question. 68 A DLC cannot, however, vote for or against the SI -at the conclusion of the debate it can report only that it has 'considered' the instrument -and debates cannot last for more than an hour and a half. 69 The SI then proceeds to a Parliamentary vote. Except in extremely rare instances where the enabling Act provides otherwise, 70 an SI cannot be amended or adapted by either House -the instrument is either approved or it is not. 71 ARP procedure in Scotland is similar.
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Aside from the (limited) examination of SIs that takes place once they have been made, there are two other points at which some independent control can be exerted. First, all proposals to delegate powers contained within primary legislation are examined by a House of Lords Select Committee, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee (DPRRC), which can report draft Bills if they contain inappropriate delegations of power or if they provide for inappropriate procedures to 67 Kelly, above n 35, at 5-7. Occasionally an instrument is laid after making and comes into force immediately but cannot remain in force unless approved within a certain period (usually 28 or 40 days). This was not the case for any of the SIs in our sample. 68 This is the accepted typescript of an paper accepted (in 2017) for publication in Legal Studies. Legal Studies is available online at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies This copy was deposited in Enlighten before the final version of the article was published; it will appear in due course. This copy may be used only for private research and study and not distributed further.
15 make delegated legislation (such as the use of NRP for a significant matter). 73 The same function is performed in Scotland by the DPLRC. 74 Both Committees do pay particular attention to the power to create criminal offences 75 and have, for example, acted to prevent the delegation of the power to create criminal offences with unlimited penalties. 76 Like the other Committees dealing with delegated legislation, however, they have no direct power and can only report matters of concern back to the government (in the hope that it will amend the Bill) or to MPs or MSPs. This is the accepted typescript of an paper accepted (in 2017) for publication in Legal Studies. Legal Studies is available online at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies This copy was deposited in Enlighten before the final version of the article was published; it will appear in due course. This copy may be used only for private research and study and not distributed further.
(a) What is required?
The first question we consider is the degree to which the creation of criminal offences in secondary legislation is democratically legitimate. Legitimacy is a complex concept that has come to mean different things in different contexts 82 (or even within the same context -legitimacy to a legal theory scholar is likely to mean something rather different to, say, a public law scholar). We are concerned
here not with the legitimacy of a governing regime, 83 but with the legitimacy of particular legal rules made under a regime that we assume, for the purposes of this paper, is a legitimate one. Our concern is specifically with democratic legitimacy, namely the requirement that a particular law must be tied in some way to the will of the people, democratically expressed. 84 This is not by any means the only way in which one might approach the question of legitimacy. Democratic legitimacy is primarily a procedural concept -it is concerned with the input (direct or indirect) that citizens have into the law making process -but one might also conceive of legitimacy in other ways, such as the substantive justice of the measure concerned 85 or its effectiveness in promoting welfare in practice. 86 We focus on democratic legitimacy here because it is particularly contentious when law is created in secondary legislation. 
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wide that invitation is extended. At the very least, it requires that the views of those affected by the law are accorded genuine weight and objections are properly considered and responded to. 
(i) The procedure used to make the instrument
The criminal offences in the 2010-11 sample were created by 87 different statutory instruments. 96 Of these, 19 were made under ARP and 68 under NRP. In the 2014 sample, the offences were created by 98 separate statutory instruments, 97 18 of which were created using ARP and 80 using NRP. As we have already seen, there is no requirement for a parliamentary vote when an instrument is made under NRP and none of the instruments in our samples were the subject of a motion to annul, so the instruments made under NRP became law without any democratic legitimacy bestowed on them by Parliament other than indirectly via the enabling Act. While it might be argued that this is democratically legitimate, in the sense that Parliament has voted to allow law making to be delegated in this way, this is a very narrow concept of legitimacy which requires nothing more than 96 Excluding three instruments of local application only. 97 Excluding three instruments of local application only and nine instruments that were Orders in Council.
This 
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In the 2010-11 sample, in 52 instances, the enabling legislation still allowed for offences to be created with a maximum penalty of two years' imprisonment. 99 In one instance, 100 the enabling legislation allowed for offences to be created with a maximum penalty of up to five years' imprisonment. 101 Where Parliament provided for maximum penalties, the resulting regulations always utilised the maximum penalty concerned. This meant that a significant number of offences were created under NRP with a maximum penalty of five years 102 or two years' imprisonment.
103
Matters improved somewhat in the 2014 sample, where limits were placed on maximum penalties in 88 of the 98 instruments. That still left 10 instruments that were not limited in this way and, as for the 2010-11 sample, the 'limits' in the remainder still allowed for the creation of offences in a sizeable number of cases with maximum sentences of two years' imprisonment or an unlimited fine.
(iii) A statutory duty to consult?
Of the 87 instruments in the 2010-11 sample, 54 were subject to a legal duty to consult on the instrument while it was still in draft. Of the 98 instruments in the 2014 sample, the equivalent figure was 43. For many of the SIs concerned, the duty to consult arose because they related to food production and under EU law consultation is always required for regulations made in this area. 104 In other instances the duty to consult stemmed from the enabling legislation, although the scope of the duty varied somewhat. So, for example, the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 provides only that, when 99 The majority of these were regulations implementing EU law made under the power in s 2 of the European Communities Act 1972. Sch 2 of the 1972 Act prohibits the creation of criminal offences with a maximum penalty of more than two years' imprisonment (see s 1(1)(d)). 100 The Water Environment (Controlled Activities) (Scotland) Regulations 2011. 101 Water Environment and Water Services (Scotland) Act 2003, Sch 2 para 20(2). It is unclear from the accompanying documentation to the Act why it was thought appropriate to allow for criminal offences to be created by secondary legislation with such a high maximum penalty. 102 The Water Environment (Controlled Activities) (Scotland) Regulations 2011 created 130 offences, all subject to a prescribed maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment.This is the accepted typescript of an paper accepted (in 2017) for publication in Legal Studies. Legal Studies is available online at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies This copy was deposited in Enlighten before the final version of the article was published; it will appear in due course. This copy may be used only for private research and study and not distributed further.
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regulations are made under its auspices, 105 'it shall be the duty of the Secretary of State … before he gives effect to the proposal, to consult such persons in the United Kingdom (if any) as he considers will be affected by the proposal'. 106 In comparison, the more specific duty contained in the Clean Air
Act 1993 107 provides that the Secretary of State must consult '(a) such persons appearing to him to represent manufacturers and users of motor vehicles; (b) such persons appearing to him to represent the producers and users of fuel for motor vehicles; and (c) such persons appearing to him to be conversant with problems of air pollution'. 108 Sometimes the enabling legislation also set out the procedure that should be followed in the consultation.
(iv) Consultation in practice
As noted above, the Government was subject to a legal duty to consult in relation to 54 of the SIs in the 2010-11 sample and 43 of the SIs in the 2014 sample. In all of these instances it is clear from the relevant Explanatory Memorandum to the SIs that consultation did take place prior to the instrument being made.
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That leaves 33 SIs in the 2010-11 sample and 55 in the 2014 sample that were not subject to a statutory duty to consult. Some of these (four in the 2010-11 sample and eleven in the 2014 sample)
were made under ARP, and would have been the subject of a parliamentary vote, which perhaps makes this less of a pressing concern. For the remainder, the absence of a legal duty to consult did This is the accepted typescript of an paper accepted (in 2017) for publication in Legal Studies. Legal Studies is available online at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies This copy was deposited in Enlighten before the final version of the article was published; it will appear in due course. This copy may be used only for private research and study and not distributed further.
22 not necessarily mean that there was no consultation process in practice -in fact for a sizeable number of the SIs concerned (ten of the 2010-11 sample and 27 of the 2014 sample) there was.
111
This still left a number of SIs across the two samples that were made under NRP and were not consulted on while in draft. Most were regulations giving effect to decisions of the UN Security
Council. 112 Aside from these, there were five instruments in the 2010-11 sample and three in the 2014 sample that were made under NRP and where no consultation on a draft order appears to have taken place. 113 For one there was an earlier consultation around the general policy principles. 114 For another the government made reference in its explanatory memorandum to the consultation that had taken place around the enabling Act. 115 For another the government reported that it had discussed the need for the legislation in the course of regular meetings it held with industry representatives and stated that the group supported the need for the Order in question. 116 For another the government reported that 'discussion' with representative stakeholder bodies had taken place.
As the JCSI has observed, 118 the fact that a consultation took place does not tell the whole story. As noted earlier, 119 the consultation might not reach those affected, consultees might not have the time or skills to respond and even if they do, this does not guarantee that any concerns will be given serious consideration. Some of the consultations in our sample were clearly extensive and led to changes to the draft regulations. One example is the Timeshare, Holiday Products, Resale and Exchange Contracts Regulations 2010, which created 14 offences, all subject to a maximum penalty of an unlimited fine. 120 A lengthy consultation document containing a draft of the proposed regulations was sent to individual companies and to trader and consumer groups who were felt by the government to have a particular interest in the legislation. It was also placed on the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills website and notices were put in the national and trade press. 121 A deadline of 12 weeks was set for responses 122 and 23 responses were received. 123 As a result, some changes were made to the draft Regulations, 124 including the abandonment of some of the proposed criminal offences. 125 Not all of the SIs in our sample were subject to such an extensive consultation. Low response rates appeared to be a problem -the consultation over the Seal Products Regulations 2010, for example, attracted only six responses. 126 The consultation on the Products Containing Meat etc. Regulations Legal Studies is available online at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies This copy was deposited in Enlighten before the final version of the article was published; it will appear in due course. This copy may be used only for private research and study and not distributed further.
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(Northern Ireland) 2014 attracted none at all. 127 This may, of course, indicate that those affected by the instrument in question were happy with the proposed legislation, 128 but it may equally mean that the consultation did not reach its target audience or that consultees were unable to respond.
The Government's account of the consultation process was also very sparse at times, meaning that it was difficult to assess the degree of support for particular proposals or whether any negative responses had been considered and responded to.
(v) What does all this tell us about democratic legitimacy?
In assessing the democratic legitimacy of the criminal offences in our sample, it should perhaps be said that legitimacy 'is not an all or nothing affair', 130 but rather a matter of degree. 131 With this in mind, the 21 SIs that were made under ARP are the least problematic in legitimacy terms, as they were subject to a parliamentary vote. 132 Those made under NRP are more problematic. There was some parliamentary control in that for at least some of them Parliament set out maximum penalties for the offences concerned (although, as discussed above, this did not always happen and even where it did the maximum penalty concerned was still a substantial term of imprisonment). A more productive route for finding democratic legitimacy here may, however, be through participatory legitimacy. Almost all of the instruments made under NRP did involve some degree of consultation with affected interests. Questions remain, however, over the degree of legitimacy this bestowed, as Legal Studies is available online at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies This copy was deposited in Enlighten before the final version of the article was published; it will appear in due course. This copy may be used only for private research and study and not distributed further.
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the mere fact that a consultation took place does not necessarily mean that there was an opportunity for genuine participation by those affected.
133

THE ISSUE OF SCRUTINY
Setting aside the question of democratic legitimacy, a further issue is whether statutory instruments containing criminal offences receive adequate scrutiny, especially when made by NRP. The two issues are not unrelated -the process of scrutiny is one that might be undertaken either by MPs, as democratic representatives, or by affected interest groups, via the process of consultation.
Legislative scrutiny is an important part of the law making process in any context but where the legislation in question is creating criminal offences, it is of heightened significance. Criminal liability is 'the strongest formal censure that society can inflict'. 134 As we have noted, 135 quite aside from any deprivation of liberty (or other penalty) that may result, the collateral impact that a criminal conviction can have on the life of an individual or the reputation of a corporation can be farreaching. This is one reason why criminal liability should be imposed only where the law conforms to certain principles. In the present context, we focus on two principles in particular. 136 The first is the principle of accessibility and fair notice, which dictates that it is clear in advance to those targeted by a provision exactly what conduct is criminal. 137 This is especially important, given that the defence of ignorance of the law is so restrictive as to be almost non-existent. 138 The second is the principle of 133 Page, above n 33, at 154. 134 A Ashworth and J Horder Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 7th edn, 2013) at 1. 135 See the text accompanying nn 26-29 above. 136 We do not suggest that these are the only relevant principles in this context -they are simply two concerns that are particularly pertinent in our sample of offences. 137 A Ashworth 'Ignorance of the criminal law, and duties to avoid it' (2011) 74 MLR 1 at 4. As Ashworth explains (at 20-23), the State's obligation to make the criminal law accessible to citizens may require the production of simplified versions of legislative texts and the implementation of a communication strategy to ensure that those subject to the law can be expected to be aware of it. Space precludes a further discussion of these points here, but government guidance is clearly an important component of the state meeting its obligations in respect of accessibility and fair notice. 138 On the particular problem posed by secondary legislation in this context, see the comments of Toulson LJ in Chambers [2008] EWCA Crim 2467 at [64] (discussed in Chalmers and Leverick, above n 7, at 559-560). On the This is the accepted typescript of an paper accepted (in 2017) for publication in Legal Studies. Legal Studies is available online at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies This copy was deposited in Enlighten before the final version of the article was published; it will appear in due course. This copy may be used only for private research and study and not distributed further.
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proportionality of sentence -the requirement that the penalty on conviction should be proportionate to the seriousness of the breach concerned.
139
In terms of these two principles, there were many instruments in our sample that performed well. It is certainly not the case that all SIs that create criminal offences are poorly drafted or contain disproportionate maximum penalties. There were, however, a number that left a lot to be desired in one or both of these respects. 140 Unlike some of the instruments in our sample, they are, at the time of writing, still in force. 141 See especially Sch 3 which sets out extremely detailed technical rules governing water related activity. 142 As discussed earlier, the Act provides that criminal offences could be made in secondary legislation with a maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment. This was used as a blanket penalty for all the criminal offences created here. 143 Sch 3 s 10.
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operation of a weir that impedes the free passage of salmon or sea trout 144 and the placing of a boulder in a river that has a length, breadth or height greater than 10% of the channel width. 145 It is not immediately apparent that these offences are of the same magnitude as the direct discharge of sewage into the water environment. The Water Regulations also contain a number of offences of failure to provide information to officials, all of which are strict liability, 146 and all of which are also potentially subject to the five year maximum penalty. Bear in mind here that the Law Commission, in
Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts, recommended that a failure to provide information or other assistance should not be a criminal offence at all unless it was intentional or reckless. 147 The approach taken in the Water Regulations is despite their being made under ARP and subject to consultation whilst in draft.
148
Another example is the Materials and Articles in Contact with Food (England) Regulations 2010 (the Contact with Food Regulations), which created 26 offences using the power contained in the Food Safety Act 1990. 149 The Regulations were made under NRP but were consulted on while in draft. 150 In terms of the accessibility of the provision, the Regulations are far from ideal. The offence creating provisions are contained in a number of different sections of the legislation. Section 13 deems breaches of the duties set out in sections 8, 10 and 11 to be a criminal offence. Sections 8 is relatively straightforward. 151 Section 10, however, provides that 'no person may manufacture any regenerated cellulose film intended to come into contact with food using any substance or group of substances other than the substances named or described in Annex II'. Section 10(2) states that 144 Sch 3 s 1. 145 Sch 3 s 14. 146 Which is not to say that a mens rea requirement would not be read in by the courts. 147 Law Commission, above n 1, at para 4.81. 148 As required under Sch 2 of the Water Act. 149 Under ss 16(2) and 17(1) and (2). 150 See the Explanatory Memorandum to the Materials and Articles in Contact with Food (England) Regulations 2010 at para 8.3. 151 And is highly specific in terms of the behaviour it prohibits: see e.g. s 8(1). This is the accepted typescript of an paper accepted (in 2017) for publication in Legal Studies. Legal Studies is available online at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies This copy was deposited in Enlighten before the final version of the article was published; it will appear in due course. This copy may be used only for private research and study and not distributed further. Regulations is an offence and section 13(2)(b) demarcates this as a less serious offence than breaches of the substantive duties, with a maximum penalty of three months' imprisonment This is the accepted typescript of an paper accepted (in 2017) for publication in Legal Studies. Legal Studies is available online at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies This copy was deposited in Enlighten before the final version of the article was published; it will appear in due course. This copy may be used only for private research and study and not distributed further.
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(compared to two years). No such distinction is made, however, in relation to the EU legislation referred to in the Contact with Food Regulations, breach of which is also an offence, despite the fact that it contains duties of assistance and information provision similar to those in section 13 (1) This is the accepted typescript of an paper accepted (in 2017) for publication in Legal Studies. Legal Studies is available online at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies This copy was deposited in Enlighten before the final version of the article was published; it will appear in due course. This copy may be used only for private research and study and not distributed further. It should be stressed again that not all of the SIs we examined performed poorly in terms of clarity and proportionality in sentencing. 158 Those discussed above, however, were not the only instruments that were problematic in these terms. They were selected for discussion because they all carry heavy maximum penalties, but there were numerous examples of instruments with less severe penalties that were equally problematic. 159 These problems existed despite the presence of the SI Committees and despite the instruments concerned being the subject of consultation exercises.
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156 See e.g. Article 6, which refers to 'Annex 1 to Directive 92/119/EEC'; Article 24, which refers to 'Regulation EC No. 183/2005'. 157 There are specific offences of failing to provide information etc. in s 18 but some of the EU legislation also contains duties to provide information, breach of which is an offence with a maximum penalty of two years' imprisonment under the By-Products Regulations. 158 Nor do we mean to suggest that primary legislation, which falls outside the scope of this paper, avoids these difficulties, as we note below.
159 See e.g. the Merchant Shipping (International Safety Management (ISM) Code) Regulations 2014 (where discovering the precise conduct that is criminalised involves a labyrinthine trawl through a lengthy EU Regulation and a search for the ISM Code adopted by the International Maritime Organisation in 1993) and the Salmon Netting Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2014 (which prohibits the use of various methods to fish for salmon, but nowhere in the Regulations does it mention that using these methods is a criminal offence).
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OPTIONS FOR CHANGE
Thus far, we have demonstrated that substantial numbers of criminal offences, often with heavy maximum penalties, are created in the UK in delegated legislation. This is potentially problematic both in terms of the democratic legitimacy of the criminal law thus created and in terms of its clarity and proportionality. With respect to the former, such legitimacy might be bestowed by parliamentary vote (as in the case under ARP procedure) or by direct participation in the legislative process via consultation. The majority of the SIs we looked at were either made under ARP or were subject to a consultation process (although there were a small minority of instruments where neither of these was the case). That said, it was not always obvious that the consultation process was particularly thorough or well documentedand if this is to be the basis upon which democratic legitimacy is bestowed, it leaves something to be desired. With respect to the content of the legislation, while many of the criminal offences defined in the SIs in our sample were very well drafted, there were a number of examples where criminal offences were confusingly defined, where apparently disproportionate maximum penalties were attached to some offences, or even where it was difficult to establish without very careful reading of the provisions exactly what conduct had been criminalised.
If these issues are to be addressed, there are a number of different ways forward, which could be deployed as alternatives or in combination. Each is discussed in turn.
(a) Limiting delegation
One possibility is to prevent the power to create criminal offences being delegated at all and require all criminal offences to be contained in primary legislation, and voted on by Parliament, as was This is the accepted typescript of an paper accepted (in 2017) for publication in Legal Studies. Legal Studies is available online at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies This copy was deposited in Enlighten before the final version of the article was published; it will appear in due course. This copy may be used only for private research and study and not distributed further.
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proposed by the Law Commission in Criminal Offences in Regulatory Contexts. 160 This would address any concerns that direct consultation is an inadequate method of securing democratic legitimacy, either in theory or in practice. It would also improve the degree of scrutiny that the legislation receives, with the result that problems with clarity or proportionality of penalty are more likely to be identified prior to the legislation coming into force. That is not to say, of course, that primary legislation is always of high quality. 161 Although difficulties of clarity are often exacerbated by the relatively technical matter of secondary legislation, there are plenty of examples of primary legislation containing criminal law provisions that leave much to be desired in terms of the quality of their drafting. 162 The scrutiny that primary legislation receives compared to delegated legislation 163 means, however, that problematic issues are far more likely to be identified and addressed in the former than the latter.
The Law Commission's proposal attracted some support in consultation responses 164 but it was also pointed out that this would be wholly impractical as there would be insufficient parliamentary time to pass all the legislation that creates criminal offences. 165 The Law Commission's recommendation does need to be considered in the context of its other proposals, including the increased use of civil penalties to replace relatively minor criminal offences, 166 so the problem of parliamentary time This is the accepted typescript of an paper accepted (in 2017) for publication in Legal Studies. Legal Studies is available online at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies This copy was deposited in Enlighten before the final version of the article was published; it will appear in due course. This copy may be used only for private research and study and not distributed further. ) that can be made in secondary legislation -crimes and délits must be created in primary legislation.
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In none of the UK jurisdictions does a formal system for classifying the seriousness of offences exist, but a line could be drawn on the basis of the magnitude of the penalty concerned. So it would be possible, for example, to mandate that all imprisonable offences be created in primary legislation or that all offences with a penalty of more than one or two years' imprisonment must be made in If secondary legislation is retained as a way of creating criminal offences -either for all offences or only for relatively minor ones -another option could be to mandate that ARP must be always used. 175 As we saw earlier, some of the enabling Acts in our sample did just this, providing that ARP must be used to make any regulations that created criminal offences (or increased the penalties for existing offences). 176 Secondary legislation does have advantages -it can be passed rapidly when there is a need to react quickly to events or where the law needs to be regularly changed or updated 177 -and the use of ARP would mean that the resulting criminal offences are voted on by Parliament. ARP does, however, leave much to be desired in terms of the opportunity for scrutiny and -if necessary -amendment during the law making process and it is clear from our sample that its use did not prevent poor quality legislation from becoming law.
(b) Participation through consultation
A final way forward -which might be deployed in combination with other changes or as a standalone option -is to rely on participation as a route to democratic legitimacy and scrutiny of legislative content. Where a criminal offence is created in an instrument made by NRP, consultation is essential for democratic legitimacy, but there is a good argument for requiring this for all legislation that creates criminal offences, in order that the Parliamentary scrutiny inherent in ARP and primary legislation can be effective and properly informed. What is important here is not simply that a consultation exercise takes place (as it did for almost all of the SIs in our sample), but that it is of sufficient quality in terms of, for example, its reach and the timeframe for responses, and that responses received (especially where they do not support the proposals) are given adequate consideration. It is worth noting again that consultation did not prevent the accessibility and proportionality problems identified earlier.
There are two main checks that already exist on the quality of consultation. One is the UK Government's Consultation Principles, 179 which apply to all Government consultations, including those relating to SIs. Under these guidelines, consultations should, inter alia, be targeted at appropriate groups; they should last for a proportionate amount of time, taking into account the nature and impact of the proposal; responses should be published within twelve weeks of the close This is the accepted typescript of an paper accepted (in 2017) for publication in Legal Studies. Legal Studies is available online at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies This copy was deposited in Enlighten before the final version of the article was published; it will appear in due course. This copy may be used only for private research and study and not distributed further.
36 of the consultation (or an explanation should be provided as to why this was not possible); and information should be provided about how many responses were received, the nature of these responses and how these have informed the policy (or here the SI) in question. Aside from the twelve week publication deadline, however, the guidelines lack any real specificity and are only guidelines. There is no sanction if they are not complied with.
The second check exists via the Committee system. As we have already noted, 180 as a direct result of concerns it had repeatedly expressed about the quality of consultations accompanying SIs, the JCSI was, from parliamentary session 2014-15, given a new term of reference to draw attention to instruments that had been subject to inadequate consultation. In the latest version of its guidance, the JCSI specifically states that it: 181 considers that proper consultation is a crucial part of the process of getting an instrument right before it is laid. As the House cannot amend secondary legislation, it is important that each instrument should have been exposed to those who will be affected by its provisions and its suitability reviewed in the light of their reactions before it is laid before Parliament.
The Explanatory Memorandum accompanying a statutory instrument, the JCSI continues, should: 182 set out who was consulted, over what period and how many people responded. There should be some analysis of the key points raised in responses and a short justification of why the department did or did not make changes to its policy in the light of the opinions expressed.
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regulations. 201 It would, however, constitute an improvement on the present situation in the UK where the available evidence suggests that the quality of consultation is highly variable.
202
CONCLUSION
In the preceding analysis, we have demonstrated that the creation of criminal offences is largely a matter of administrative action (in the form of delegated legislation) rather than a Parliamentary decision and that substantial numbers of criminal offences are being created in delegated legislation which carry heavy maximum penalties. This presents a challenge to the orthodox position in criminal law scholarship, which treats criminalisation as a solemn matter for the legislature, and where debate has focused primarily on the criteria that should be used to determine the content of the criminal law and on the principles -such as fair notice and proportionality of sentence -to which such offences should conform. This scholarship is immensely valuable, but the process by which criminal offences are created should also be given critical attention.
The extensive creation of criminal offences by delegated legislation raises an important question, which is how such criminalisation is to be regarded as democratically legitimate, if it is not voted on by Parliament. Such democratic legitimacy might be secured through the implementation of effective consultation processes, but we question whether this is sufficient in respect of offences which carry (sometimes lengthy) periods of imprisonment as a maximum penalty. While Parliament clearly cannot be constrained from delegating the power to create imprisonable offences if it so desires, it would be desirable, as a matter of practice, to apply a principle that serious criminal offences should only be created by primary legislation, with seriousness being defined by reference to the maximum sentence of imprisonment applicable on conviction. Exactly where the threshold This is the accepted typescript of an paper accepted (in 2017) for publication in Legal Studies. Legal Studies is available online at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies This copy was deposited in Enlighten before the final version of the article was published; it will appear in due course. This copy may be used only for private research and study and not distributed further.
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should be drawn is a matter for further debate -but it is important that it is drawn at a level that is neither ineffective nor places too heavy a burden on parliamentary capacity.
For less serious offences, however, democratic legitimacy is still a concern. The stigma of a criminal conviction is potentially very serious, and the collateral consequences (for individuals and corporations) can be very severe, even where the direct penalty imposed is relatively minor. The importance of the consultation processes in legitimating secondary legislation that creates criminal offences must be sufficiently recognised and consultation -if it is to do the work of legitimating the criminal law -must be taken seriously and done properly. While recent developments in this area are promising, the problems identified in the JCSI's 2015 report indicate that there is still work to be done in ensuring that full and proper consultation is carried out in all cases where criminal offences are created by delegated legislation. One way forward could be to adopt in the UK jurisdictions something akin to the Administrative Procedure Act 1946 to regulate criminal law making in delegated legislation, by imposing a blanket legal requirement of consultation and by setting out procedural and reporting criteria which must be met in terms of, for example, the timeframe for responses and the regard that must be given to any opposition expressed.
Together, these measures -requiring parliamentary approval for the creation of serious criminal offences and mandating a proper consultation process for the remainder -would address the concerns we have articulated about the democratic legitimacy of creating criminal offences via delegated legislation. They may also have a positive effect on the quality of the delegated legislation concerned, by improving the degree of scrutiny it receives. That is not to say, of course, that all problems with the quality of criminal law would disappear. Parliamentary scrutiny does not necessarily result in perfect legislation -the best that can be said is that the higher degree of scrutiny primary legislation receives compared to delegated legislation reduces the risk of difficulties This is the accepted typescript of an paper accepted (in 2017) for publication in Legal Studies. Legal Studies is available online at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-studies This copy was deposited in Enlighten before the final version of the article was published; it will appear in due course. This copy may be used only for private research and study and not distributed further.
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occurring. There is also a limit to what consultation can achieve in this respect. Even the bestpublicised and lengthy of consultations may not succeed in attracting responses. Ensuring that affected parties are at least afforded the opportunity to participate in this way and that the results of such consultation are openly and fully recorded would nonetheless represent an improvement on the present position.
